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Seeing	and	Unmaking	Civilians	in	Afghanistan:		
Visual	Technologies	and	Contested	Professional	Visions		Christiane	Wilke,	Carleton	University		christiane.wilke@carleton.ca			In	the	early	hours	of	September	4th,	2009,	a	NATO	airstrike	targeted	people	who	had	gathered	around	two	stolen	trucks	carrying	fuel	for	NATO	troops	that	had	gotten	stuck	on	a	sand	bank	near	Kunduz.	According	to	different	reports,	the	attack,	which	was	ordered	by	German	troops	and	executed	by	U.S.	F-15E	fighter	pilots,	killed	between	50	and	179	people,	among	them	between	zero	and	113	civilians	(Bundestag	2011;	Amnesty	International	2009).	This	article	analyzes	the	“scopic	regimes”	(Gregory	2011,	190)	and	contestations	over	professional	vision	(Goodwin	1994;	Vertesi	2014)	in	the	context	of	this	airstrike,	querying	how	different	modes	of	professional	vision	could	lead	to	starkly	different	accounts	of	the	events	and	counts	of	civilian	casualties.		How	do	NATO	officers	see	civilians?	Which	knowledges,	perspectives,	and	collaborative	practices	of	professional	vision	do	they	employ?	Which	hierarchies	of	knowledges,	technologies,	and	points	of	view	are	affirmed	in	the	process?	What	accounts	for	the	stark	disparities	between	the	reports,	and	how	are	differences	in	professional	vision	discussed	and	resolved?	I	focus	on	the	divergences	between	the	different	counts	and	accounts	
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in	order	to	shed	light	on	the	instability	of	the	category	of	civilians	as	well	as	the	contingent	and	contested	nature	of	professional	vision.	As	Sally	Engle	Merry	and	Susan	Bibler	Coutin	argue,	regimes	of	measurement	and	quantification	obscure	the	ambiguities	of	the	categories	that	are	being	employed.	The	instability	of	categories	and	their	“local	translation[s]”	(Merry	&	Bibler	Coutin	2014,	3)	becomes	visible	by	reading	reports	not	only	against	the	grain,	but	also	against	each	other.	Such	a	reading	demonstrates	that	visual	technologies	are	not	neutral	tools	for	making	civilians	visible.	Instead,	civilians	are	produced	through	what	I	will	call	specific	
socio-cultural	prisms	of	visibility	in	which	technologies	play	an	important	enabling	and	legitimating	role.		The	distinction	between	civilians	and	combatants,	well	established	in	international	law,	is	not	easily	made	in	counter-insurgency	warfare	in	Afghanistan:	German	officers	reported	being	unable	to	reliably	distinguish	civilians	from	combatants	among	the	people	they	met	on	the	street	(Münch	2009,	Bundestag	2011).	In	response	to	these	visual	crises,	German	as	well	as	US	NATO	officers	have	chosen	new	vantage	points	for	visualizing	and	analyzing	the	life	under	their	jurisdiction.	The	prisms	of	the	“camera-bombers”	(Butler	2010)	afford	decision	makers	the	view	from	above;	a	view	that	abstracts	and	allows	for	a	“narrowing	of	vision”	that	“brings	into	very	sharp	focus	certain	limited	aspects	of	an	otherwise	more	complex	and	unwieldy	reality”	(Scott	1991,	191).	From	the	vantage	point	of	the	plane,	civilians	are	identified	not	by	their	lack	of	“distinctive	sign	visible	at	a	distance,”	as	the	Geneva	Conventions	would	suggest,	but	by	their	spatial	locations,	proximities,	and	patterns	of	movement.	The	analysis	of	these	video	feeds	relies	on	“professional	vision”	(Goodwin	1994)	that,	in	turn,	is	based	on	assumptions,	ways	of	seeing,	and	experiences	that	circulate	among	the	military	professionals.	Seeing	is	collaborative	work	that	depends	on	the	use	of	a	shared	vocabulary	for	describing	and	interpreting	images.	In	Afghanistan,	NATO	officers	rarely	use	the	“civilian/combatant”	binary.	Instead	they	operate	with	a	narrower	understanding	of	
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civilians	as	“uninvolved	persons”	and	a	wider	understanding	of	non-civilians	as	persons	who	are	“militants,”	“Taliban,”	or	“insurgents”––whether	or	not	the	person	is	a	member	of	a	group	with	which	NATO	is	at	war.	The	shifts	in	technologies	of	vision	and	in	the	vantage	point	do	not	by	themselves	lead	to	ways	of	seeing	civilians	that	result	in	low	counts	of	civilian	casualties.	Rather,	these	forms	of	vision,	exercised	by	officers	as	part	of	an	epistemic	and	professional	community,	are	underwritten	by	colonial	and	racial	histories	of	the	civilian	status	that	surface	in	the	verbal	communication	that	accompanies	the	acts	of	sight	and	violence.	The	civilian	is	not	“found”	in	the	image	but	produced	by	“siting	prisms”	(Feldman	2005,	208),	collaborative	interpretations	of	visual	data	and	the	“aerial	viewpoint”	(Adey	et	al.	2011,	176)	that	enables	surveillance	as	well	as	violence	from	above,	fused	together	as	surviolence.		This	article	proceeds	with	an	account	of	the	Kunduz	airstrike,	followed	by	a	consideration	of	how	civilians	have	been	defined,	imagined,	and	seen	in	practice.	The	second	half	of	the	article	analyzes	the	modes	of	coding	and	seeing	civilians	that	were	at	work	in	the	Kunduz	airstrike	and	its	aftermath.		
1.	Kunduz,	September	2009	On	September	3,	2009	in	the	afternoon,	Taliban	fighters	ambushed	and	abducted	two	drivers	of	trucks	loaded	with	fuel	for	NATO	coalition	forces	in	the	vicinity	of	Kunduz.	The	abductors	directed	the	drivers	to	drive	the	trucks	through	a	sandbank	across	the	Kunduz	River,	where	the	trucks	got	stuck	at	around	6:15	pm	(Bundestag	2011:	44).	The	Taliban	went	to	surrounding	villages	to	ask	for––or	demand––help	to	pull	the	trucks	out	with	tractors.	When	these	efforts	did	not	yield	any	results,	they	asked	villagers	to	come	with	containers	and	get	fuel	in	an	attempt	to	reduce	the	weight	of	the	trucks	and	make	them	maneuverable	again.	According	to	most	accounts,	the	villagers	were	told	that	they	could	keep	the	fuel	(Bundestag	2011;	Amnesty	International	2009a,	2009c).		
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At	about	8pm,	the	NATO’s	Provincial	Reconstruction	Team	(PRT)	in	Kunduz,	staffed	with	German	forces,	found	out	about	the	abduction.	Resonating	with	the	German	political	elite’s	insistence	on	not	joining	a	war	in	Afghanistan,	the	PRT	Kunduz	which	had	started	with	a	focus	on	development	aid	rather	than	combat.	Yet	in	the	months	leading	up	to	the	September	2009	air	strike,	the	PRT	Kunduz	had	increasingly	come	under	attack	by	Taliban	forces	(Feldenkirchen,	Gebauer	and	Koelbl	2009).	In	a	polarized	political	environment,	local	politicians	had	pressured	the	German	troops	to	act	more	decisively,	that	is,	violently,	against	the	Taliban	and	their	supporters	(Ruttig	2010,	7).	In	June	2009,	two	German	soldiers	based	in	Kunduz	were	killed	in	a	suicide	attack	(Feldenkirchen,	Gebauer	and	Koelbl	2009).	As	German	forces	in	Kunduz	increasingly	felt	threatened	and	unable	to	trust	the	local	population	(Münch	2009),	their	stance	became	more	aggressive	and	the	willingness	to	employ	violence	increased.	During	the	same	summer,	ISAF	commander	General	Stanley	McChrystal	issued	a	widely	discussed	tactical	directive	directing	officers	to	limit	the	use	of	air	strikes	and	prioritize	the	protection	of	the	civilian	population	in	order	to	gain	and	maintain	their	support	(ISAF	2009a).	The	US-led	ISAF	command	was	concerned	about	civilian	casualties	as	a	liability	in	counterinsurgency	warfare	while	the	German	PRT	command	had	resolved	to	defend	its	troops	more	resolutely	than	in	the	past.	These	two	different	logics	collided	during	the	night	of	the	bombing	as	well	in	the	aftermath.	They	structured	the	use	of	vision,	the	choice	of	vantage	points,	and	the	levels	of	trust	in	the	visual	capacities	and	judgments	of	other	actors.			When	PRT	commander	Colonel	Georg	Klein	received	the	information	about	the	abduction,	he	was	concerned	about	the	missing	fuel	trucks	rather	than	the	fate	of	the	drivers	(who	were	Afghan	civilians).	In	consultation	with	other	officers,	he	mobilized	two	sources	of	information	gathering:	an	Afghan	informant	and	a	B-1	bomber	(Bundestag	2011,	48-49).	The	communication	with	the	local	informant	was	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	translator	did	not	have	a	security	clearance	and	was	therefore	not	allowed	to	enter	the	command	station.	
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Officers	periodically	went	to	see	the	translator	who	kept	phone	contact	with	the	source	(Bundestag	2011,	51).	At	about	midnight,	the	plane’s	pilot	located	the	abducted	trucks	on	the	sandbank	(Bundestag	2011,	49).	The	informant	soon	arrived	at	or	near	the	scene.	His	descriptions	were	vivid	enough	to	suggest	close	proximity,	but	there	was	no	evidence	that	he	could	personally	see	the	trucks	or	the	people	surrounding	them	(Bundestag	2011,	51).	In	Colonel	Klein’s	view,	the	informant’s	verbal	reports	and	the	officers’	interpretation	of	the	video	feeds	from	the	B-1	plane	pointed	to	similar	conclusions.	Several	officers	agreed	that	the	plane’s	footage	suggested	that	around	70	persons	were	present	in	the	vicinity	of	the	trucks	(Bundestag	2011,	53).	When	the	B-1	plane	had	to	return	to	the	base	to	refuel,	Klein	lost	visual	access	to	the	site.	The	only	option	for	accessing	the	view	from	above	would	be	to	ask	for	“aerial	support”	that	is	possible	in	cases	of		“imminent	threat”	when	there	is	a	“troops	in	contact”	situation.	Klein	made	that	call,	thereby	transforming	a	murky	and	visually	inaccessible	situation	into	a	stated	emergency	that	would	require	the	presence	of	both	enemy	combatants	and	“friendly	forces”	under	threat.	The	fiction	of	an	“imminent	threat”	with	“troops	in	contact”	also	affored	Klein	the	power	to	authorize	an	airstrike	that	would	normally––in	the	absence	of	a	time-sensitive	situation––have	to	be	approved	by	superiors	(Brenner	2009).	The	emergency	became	the	enabling	fiction	that	allowed	Klein	access	to	“eyeballs	in	the	sky”	(Wood	2010:	32)	and	gave	him	heightened	decision	making	authority.			At	1:08am,	two	F-15E	pilots	reported	to	Klein.	With	the	aid	of	the	infrared	night	vision	technology	(F-15E.Info	2012),	they	located	the	site	and	saw	50-70	people	in	the	vicinity	of	the	trucks.	The	planes	and	the	PRT	command	center	were	linked	via	the	ROVER	(Remotely	Operated	Video	Enhanced	Receiver)	device	that	allows	ground	troops	to	have	real	time	access	to	the	video	feed	from	an	aerial	vehicle	(see	Grant	2013).	Although	the	pilots	and	the	PRT	officers	saw	the	same	set	of	moving	images,	they	had	different	interpretations	of	these	images	that	were	rooted	in	their	organizational	contexts:	the	pilots	had	internalized	the	new	tactical	
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directive	and	changed	rules	of	engagement	(ROE)	under	which	“responsibility	falls	on	fighter	pilots	and	other	aircrew	members	to	work	with	ground	forces	to	find,	if	possible,	a	solution	other	than	releasing	ordnance	on	a	target”	(Wood	2010,	310).	The	German	officers	in	Kunduz,	in	turn,	received	this	tactical	directive	at	a	time	when	they	felt	increasingly	besieged	and	determined	to	fight	back.	Their	visual	understanding	of	the	site	was	structured	by	their	imagination	of	the	local	population	as	hostile	and	of	the	trucks	as	potential	bombs	that	could	be	used	to	attack	the	PRT.		The	transcript	of	the	conversation	(2009b)	reveals	that	the	German	Joint	Terminal	Attack	Controller	(JTAC)	told	the	pilots	that	the	persons	on	the	ground	are	insurgents.	The	pilots	never	fully	adopted	this	vocabulary	and	repeatedly	asked	about	the	fate	of	the	drivers.	They	also	questioned	the	appropriateness	of	the	“troops	in	contact”	scenario	and	the	assertion	of	an	“imminent	threat”	(Bundestag	2011,	62,	65;	ISAF	2009b).	At	1:49am	on	September	4,	2009,	one	hour	after	telling	each	other	“dude,	we	can’t	bomb	that”	(ISAF	2009b,	4),	the	pilots	dropped	two	500-pound	bombs	on	the	people	in	the	vicinity	of	the	trucks.	The	portion	of	the	video	feed	from	one	plane	that	includes	the	strikes	has	been	leaked	(ISAF	2009c).	It	shows	the	landscape	and	the	people	in	grainy	black	and	white.	The	crosshairs	in	the	middle	of	the	frame	remind	us	that	we	are	seeing	the	scene	not	just	from	a	perspective	of	surveillance,	but	also	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	weapon	and	of	the	killers.	The	bombs	are	released.	Their	impact	is	exacerbated	by	the	explosion	of	the	remaining	fuel	in	the	trucks	mixed	with	oxygen	from	the	air	inside	the	truck.	In	a	“reversal	of	gesture	and	intention,”	(Butler	1993:	206),	the	PRT	officers	who	feared	that	the	Taliban	could	turn	the	trucks	“into	massive	and	deadly	bombs”	(Wood	2010:	32)	had	preempted	this	scenario	by	doing	so	themselves.			 [insert	images	1,	2,	3,	4	about	here]		
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After	conferring	with	the	pilots,	the	PRT	Kunduz	filed	a	report	indicating	56	casualties,	all	Taliban.	The	number	was	based	on	a	calculation:	If	70	persons	had	been	present	and	bombs	typically	kill	80%	of	those	in	the	vicinity,	the	strike	would	have	left	56	people	dead	(Bundestag	2011,	68).	The	PRT	reluctantly	revised	these	numbers	on	the	basis	of	subsequent	hospital	visits	and	missions	to	nearby	villages	(Brenner	2009;	Bundestag	2011,	72).	On	the	next	day,	ISAF	Commander	General	Stanley	McChrystal	visited	the	sandbank	and	the	Kunduz	hospital	as	part	of	an	ISAF	investigation.	According	to	a	Washington	Post	journalist	who	was	embedded	with	the	ISAF	forces,	this	investigation	concluded	that	about	125	people	were	killed	in	the	air	strike,	at	least	two	dozen	of	whom	were	insurgents	(Chandrasekaran	2009).	The	article	juxtaposes	the	explanations	of	the	German	officers	with	statements	from	ten	year	old	Mohammed	Shafiullah,	who	had	come	to	the	river	on	a	donkey	to	find	out	what	was	happening:	“We	heard	there	was	a	tanker	and	everyone	was	going	to	collect	free	fuel.”	While	the	PRT	Kunduz	still	maintained	that	only	insurgents	had	been	targeted,	General	McChrystal	told	the	reporter	that	“it	was	clear	there	were	some	civilians	harmed	at	that	site.”	He	used	the	investigation	as	an	opportunity	to	show	“whether	we	are	willing	to	be	transparent	and	whether	we	are	willing	to	show	that	we	are	going	to	protect	the	Afghan	people”	(Chandrasekaran	2009).	Yet	on	the	same	day	that	McChrystal	demonstratively	vowed	to	ascertain	the	status	of	those	who	were	harmed	in	the	strike,	the	German	Minister	of	Defense	assured	the	media	that	“only	Taliban”	had	been	killed	(Bundestag	2011,	1).	While	Colonel	Klein	and	his	German	superiors	insisted	on	the	insurgent	status	of	the	victims	before	and	without	any	further	investigation,	General	McChrystal	used	this	event	as	a	test	for	his	new	strategy	in	which	“gaining	and	maintaining”	the	support	of	the	population	is	“the	overriding	operational	imperative”	(ISAF	2009a).	Portions	of	the	July	2009	directive	had	been	made	public	“in	order	to	ensure	a	broader	awareness	of	the	intent	and	scope	of	General	McChrystal’s	guidance	to	ISAF	and	USFOR-A	forces”	(ISAF	2009a,	1).	The	public	portion	of	the	
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document	emphasizes:	“We	must	avoid	the	trap	of	winning	tactical	victories––but	suffering	strategic	defeats––by	causing	civilian	casualties	or	excessive	damage	and	thus	alienating	the	people”	(2009a,	1).	The	publicly	expressed	concern	about	civilian	deaths	is	part	of	the	overall	strategy	of	prioritizing	“popular	support”	in	Afghanistan.	Counting	and	investigating	civilian	deaths	in	the	aftermath	of	an	air	strike	becomes	part	of	a	broader	matrix	of	counterinsurgency	warfare.		The	ISAF	investigations	were	only	the	beginning	of	a	chain	of	investigations	into	the	airstrikes	by	different	actors.	In	the	weeks	after	the	attack,	at	least	seven	different	investigations	were	conducted:	by	the	NATO	forces,	by	the	Afghan	Government,	by	the	UN	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	by	the	Red	Cross/Crescent,	by	the	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	by	Dr.	Habibe	Erfan	in	her	position	as	a	member	of	the	regional	government,	and	by	Amnesty	International.	These	investigations	used	different	methodologies	and	yielded	strikingly	disparate	numbers	of	casualties.	The	German	parliamentary	committee	report	is	the	most	recent	and	voluminous	of	these	reports.	It	was	published	in	October	2011.	It	is	550	pages	long,	contains	a	number	of	separate	votes,	and	is	based	on	dozens	of	interviews	with	witnesses	and	careful	scrutiny	of	earlier	reports.	The	committee	was	instated	because	of	widespread	public	perception	that	German	military	officers	and	their	political	superiors	had	been	covering	up	evidence	of	civilian	casualties	in	the	Kunduz	incident.	Several	high	military	officials	had	resigned,	admitting	responsibility	for	disseminating	wrong	and	misleading	information	(Bundestag	2011,	2).			
Table	1:	Investigations	into	the	deaths	caused	by	the	air	strike	
Author	 Date	
Published	
Casualties	
(overall)	
Civilian	
casualties	
Taliban/	
combatant	
casualties	PRT	Kunduz	 Sept	4,	2009	 56	 0	 56	Informant	 Sept	4,	2009	 70-90	 0	 79-90	ISAF	 Sept	6,	2009	 125	 	 At	least	24	Afghan	Government	 Sept	10,	2009	 99	 30	 69	
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UN	Mission	 Sept	10,	2009	 109	 74	 35	Red	Cross/Crescent	 confidential	 confidential	 confidential	 confidential	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission	 	 102	 	 	Dr.	Habibe	Erfan	(Kunduz	Regional	Government)	 Nov	2009	 179	 113	(25-26	children)	 	Amnesty	International	 Oct	30,	2009	 142	 83	 	German	Parliamentary	Committee	 Oct	2011	 50	 few	 many		The	stark	disagreements	about	the	numbers	and	status	of	the	persons	who	were	killed	in	the	attack	are	troubling	on	several	levels.	The	numbers	of	casualties	matter	not	only	to	the	communities	of	the	victims,	but	also	to	those	who	have	authorized	the	war	on	the	side	of	NATO.	Yet	a	focus	on	the	precise	numbers	of	casualties	can	also	obscure	the	broader	legal	and	ethical	questions:	the	presence	of	a	war	crime	is	not	determined	by	a	minimum	number	of	civilian	casualties,	and	to	argue	that	“too	many”	civilians	have	been	killed	might	tacitly	allow	that	there	is	a	number	of	casualties	that	is	unobjectionable	(Zehfuss	2011,	558).	In	addition,	the	brute	fact	that	there	is	considerable	disagreement	about	the	numbers	of	casualties,	especially	their	status	as	civilian	or	non-civilian,	might	suggest	that	the	line	between	civilians	and	combatants	is	not	as	clear	as	supporters	of	new	technologies	that	allegedly	reduce	“collateral	damage”	and	civilian	casualties	would	like	to	suggest	(Grant	2013,	41).	Rather,	the	persistent	efforts	to	count	(and	minimize)	civilian	casualties	performatively	suggest	that	the	category	of	civilian	is	unproblematic,	stable,	and	unambiguous.	Yet	a	closer	look	at	the	practices	of	counting	civilian	casualties	reveals	that	the	category	of	civilian	is	a	product	of	sighting	technologies	that	depend	on	culturally	specific	vocabularies,	assumptions,	and	practices.			
Seeing	is	Talking	is	Seeing	
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In	investigating	the	disparities	in	the	casualty	counts,	I	rely	on	the	science	and	technology	studies	literature	that	treats	seeing	as	a	mediated,	professional,	and	collaborative	activity	(Goodwin	1994;	Vertesi	2014;	Feldman	2005).	Sight	is	enabled	and	produced	by	technologies	such	as	the	night	vision	cameras	and	the	ROVER	networked	device	that	allow	the	pilots	and	the	ground	troops	to	see	the	scene	in	synchrony.	While	the	technologies	enable	and	shapes	the	image	production	and	therefore	the	actions	that	are	possible	or	precluded	on	the	basis	of	the	images,	this	case	study	draws	attention	to	the	collaborative	and	contested	interpretation	of	images	and	visual	data.	As	Goodwin	(1994),	Vertesi	(2014),	and	Amoore	(2009)	have	shown,	vision	in	science,	technology,	and	policing	is	trained,	shaped	by	professional	norms	about	focusing	attention,	reading	visual	data,	and	using	the	lenses	and	filters	that	yield	professionally	appropriate	results.	Above	all,	vision	is	collective,	collaborative,	and	discursive.	Ethnographies	of	professional	vision	emphasize	the	crucial	role	of	talking,	pointing	to	specific	details	or	patterns,	and	discussing	images	in	the	process	of	interpretation:	faced	with	new	images,	professionals	use	words	and	gestures	to	guide	each	other	in	developing	a	shared	professional	vision.	While	these	discursive	and	embodied	dissemination	strategies	of	“proper”	vision	might	result	in	a	genuine	consensus	on	how	to	look	and	what	to	see,	quite	often	professionals	disagree	about	what	is	to	be	seen	and	what	could	be	seen.	These	disagreements	can	be	smoothed	over	if	some	participants	stay	silent	or	emphasize	the	similarities	between	what	they	and	others	are	seeing,	or	they	can	come	to	the	fore	when	competing	interpretations	are	made	public.	In	hierarchical	organizations	such	as	the	military	or	the	police,	the	spaces	for	contesting	a	dominant	way	of	looking	and	seeing	will	be	smaller	than	in	scientific	communities	where	researchers	establish	their	originality	precisely	by	seeing	things	differently	than	their	peers	(see,	for	example,	Vertesi	2014).	Vision	is	expressed	in	words;	what	remains	unspeakable	will	not	be	fully	visible.	For	example,	Judith	Butler	demonstrates	that	the	vastly	divergent	interpretations	of	the	video	
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footage	of	Rodney	King’s	beating	show	“a	racially	saturated	field	of	visibility”	(1993,	205)	in	which	King	is	construed	as	the	agent	of	violence	even	as	he	is	being	beaten.	Similarly,	Goodwin	(1994)	establishes	that	the	police	officers’	defense	in	this	case	rested	on	describing	their	own	violent	acts	as	reactive	to	King’s	allegedly	aggressive	or	disobedient	behavior.	Interpretations	of	visual	sequences,	of	cause	and	effect,	anticipation	and	retaliation,	are	saturated	with	assumptions	about	race,	agency,	intention,	and	violence:	“Attributing	violence	to	the	object	of	violence	is	part	of	the	very	mechanism	that	recapitulates	violence,	and	that	makes	the	jury’s	‘seeing’	into	a	complicity	with	that	police	violence”	(Butler	1993,	209).	In	the	case	of	the	Kunduz	airstrike,	the	evidence	of	what	was	seen	comes	to	us	in	the	form	of	reports,	testimony,	and	a	transcript	of	the	communication	between	the	F-15	pilots	and	the	JTAC	officers.	While	a	short	portion	of	the	video	feed	is	available	on	YouTube	(ISAF	2009c),	the	bulk	of	the	evidence	is	in	(transcribed)	verbal	form	ISAF	2009b,	Brenner	2009).	As	a	result,	this	airstrike	allows	us	to	focus	on	the	role	of	language	and	communication	in	interpreting	technologically	mediated	images.	The	pilots	and	the	officers	on	the	ground	grappled	with	the	appropriateness	of	categories	and	the	implications	of	using	them.		The	“epistemic	commitments”	of	these	actors,	expressed	in	words,	doubts,	and	silences,	shaped	their	ways	of	seeing	(Vertesi	2014,	17).		Interpretations	of	visual	images	are	based	on	concepts	that	are	defined,	contested,	and	shared	in	professional	communities.	Concepts	get	operationalized,	act	as	labels	for	categories	into	which	incidents	and	deaths	are	sorted,	and	become	parts	of	a	chain	of	counting	and	quantification.	These	“knowledge	systems”	make	“particular	versions	of	social	reality	visible”	and	subject	to	(ac)counting	(Merry	and	Coutin	2014,	3).	The	proliferation	of	reports	that	count,	dispute,	or	confirm	civilian	casualties	suggest	that	“civilian”	is	a	stable	category,	that	“civilian	casualties”	can	be	counted	without	significant	ambiguities,	and	that	“civilians”	can	therefore	be	distinguished	from	non-civilians.	Yet	histories	of	the	concept	of	the	civilian	
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suggest	a	more	complicated	relationship	between	politics,	law,	visual	technologies,	and	civilian	status.		
2.	Civilized	Distinctions	The	international	law	of	armed	conflict	is	structured	around	the	distinction	between	civilians	and	combatants.	Combatants	may	target	combatants,	but	not	civilians.	Civilians	are	expected	not	to	take	part	in	the	hostilities.	Civilian	deaths	may,	however,	occur	as	“collateral	damage”	of	attacks	on	combatants	and	military	objects	(Owens	2003).	The	norms	about	the	permissible	scope	of	“collateral”	or	“accidental”	harm	to	civilians	are	contested	(Zehfuss	2011).	However,	international	lawyers	insist	on	the	fundamental	distinction	between	combatants	and	non-combatants.	At	the	same	time,	studies	of	armed	conflict	suggest	not	only	that	the	classification	of	persons	as	combatants	or	civilians	is	often	debatable	and	contested	(Berman	2004,	Kinsella	2011),	but	also	that	combatants	frequently	do	not	know	how	to	ascertain	who	is	a	civilian	(Münch	2009).		The	distinction	between	civilians	and	combatants	is	a	largely	visual	exercise.	The	third	Geneva	Convention	requires	that	in	case	of	doubt,	armed	forces	have	to	fulfill	the	conditions	of	“being	commanded	by	a	person	responsible	for	his	subordinates,”	“of	having	a	fixed	distinctive	sign	recognizable	at	a	distance,”	“of	carrying	arms	openly,”	and	“of	conducting	their	operations	in	accordance	with	the	laws	and	customs	of	war”	(Third	Geneva	Convention	1949,	Art.	4	para.2).	Two	of	these	four	criteria	pertain	to	the	expected	behavior:	militaries	are	expected	to	be	hierarchically	organized	and	to	observe	the	laws	of	war.	The	other	two	criteria	are	visual	and	enable	participants	and	observers	to	distinguish	combatants	from	civilians:	“Having	a	fixed	distinctive	sign	recognizable	at	a	distance”	and	“carrying	arms	openly.”	Civilians	are	defined	by	their	lack,	by	their	opposites:	they	are	not	combatants	(Garbett	2012).	They	do	not	carry	arms,	or	they	do	not	carry	them	openly.	They	do	not	have	a	distinctive	sign	
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recognizable	at	a	distance,	at	any	distance.	This	framework	was	developed	with	a	specific	spatio-temporal	imaginary	of	war	in	mind:	wars	between	Western	nation	states,	not	wars	of	colonial	conquest	or	anti-colonial	insurgency.		The	genealogy	of	the	term	“civilian”	suggests	that	non-Europeans	were	not	among	its	intended	beneficiaries:	“Civilian,”	as	a	term	in	relationship	to	war,	first	appeared	in	the	English	language	in	the	18th	century	and	“referred	to	European	servants	employed	by	the	East	India	Company”	(Gregory	2006,	633).	While	the	term	was	used	to	refer	to	European	non-combatant	populations	during	World	War	I	(Alexander	2007),	non-European	populations	under	European	rule	were	called	“natives,”	not	“civilians”	(Wilke	2015).		Colonial	wars	were	often	characterized	as	police	actions,	mutinies	or	“small	wars”	because	the	colonized	peoples	were	not	recognized	as	a	state	and	thus	lacked	the	right	to	go	to	war.	In	this	logic,	where	there	are	no	legitimate	combatants,	there	are	no	legitimate	civilians.		What,	then,	should	civilians	look	like?	The	formal	legal	frameworks	stress	visual	cues	for	identifying	combatants,	such	as	carrying	weapons	openly	(at	least	during	an	attack),	wearing	uniforms,	and	being	distinguishable	from	the	non-combatant	population.	Yet	the	history	of	the	use	of	the	specific	term	civilian	suggests	two	other	markers:	civilians	have	been	gendered	as	feminine,	passive,	and	helpless	(Carpenter	2006).	In	addition,	civilians	have	been	raced	as	white	(Kinsella	2011).	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	white	women	have	always	been	the	prototypical	civilians:	historically,	the	white	“civilians”	outside	of	Europe	were	men	who	worked	as	colonial	administrators	and	in	other	non-military	positions.	Looking	at	these	intersectional	matrices	of	gender,	race,	dress,	and	location,	we	begin	to	understand	that	“seeing	civilians”	is	not	a	simple	or	“transparent”	process	(Goodwin	1994,	606).	Rather,	it	is	a	highly	context	specific	process	that	requires	the	mobilization	of	concepts,	coding	schemes,	epistemic	presumptions,	narratives	of	danger	and	security,	and	technologies	that	help	to	
	 14	
suppress	“cognitive	and	perceptual	uncertainties”	in	the	categorization	of	people	into	a	binary	civilian/combatant	scheme	(Goodwin	1994,	626).			
3.	Afghanistan:	Invisible	Enemies,	Invisible	Civilians	When	German	officers	who	participated	in	the	Kunduz	airstrike	were	later	asked	how	they	distinguished	between	civilians	and	combatants,	their	responses	were	evasive	(Bundestag	2011,	55).	Colonel	Klein	suggested:	“You	cannot	tell	civilians	from	Taliban.	According	to	our	experience,	these	people	[Taliban]	wear	civilian	clothing.	They	don’t	wear	uniforms,	they	are	not	recognizable	as	combatants	in	a	narrower	sense,	they	carry	weapons	or	they	don’t	carry	weapons”	(Bundestag	2011,	55).	While	these	statements	are	influenced	by	the	social	context	and	the	officers’	desire	to	minimize	their	responsibility	for	civilian	deaths,	a	study	on	the	perceptions	of	security	and	insecurity	by	German	soldiers	stationed	in	Afghanistan	that	was	published	before	the	September	2009	airstrike	uncovers	important	everyday	practices	and	understandings	shared	by	officers	of	different	ranks.	The	German	troops’	theoretical	training	modules	largely	“presume	that	the	enemy	is	clearly	recognizable”	(Münch	2009,	22).	Yet	as	the	security	situation	in	Kunduz	became	more	volatile,	soldiers	who	spent	time	outside	the	camp	and	interact	with	the	local	population	had	become	increasingly	convinced	that	“there	is	no	clearly	identifiable	enemy”	because	loyalties	and	local	alliances	shifted	frequently	(Münch	2009,	48).	The	percentage	of	soldiers	who	expressed	generalized	mistrust	in	the	local	population	and	fear	of	attacks	had	increased	significantly	in	the	months	prior	to	the	September	2009	air	strike	(Münch	2009,	48-50).	In	the	attacks	against	German	soldiers	that	had	become	more	frequent	since	2007,	the	author	of	the	attack,	be	it	a	sniper	or	the	persons	who	built	and	deposited	an	improvised	explosive	device	(IED)	would	be	invisible	to	the	surviving	soldiers.	The	fear	of	amorphous	and	visually	indistinct	enemies	and	dangers	was	not	necessarily	reported	to	the	superiors	in	the	military	chain	of	command.	Rather,	those	
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who	wrote	reports	hewed	to	the	official	terminology	and	theory	of	“irregular	forces”	and	liberally	ascribe	attacks	to	enemies	such	as	“irregular	forces”	or	“Islamic	networks”	or	“insurgents”	or	“Taliban”	that	were	plausible	according	to	the	official	knowledges	that	had	circulated	(Münch	2009,	48,	60,	65).			
4.	Shifting	Binaries	For	German	officers	who	were	part	of	the	NATO	contingent,	then,	the	vocabulary	and	implicit	ways	of	seeing	that	the	Geneva	Conventions	suggest	for	distinguishing	combatants	and	civilians	was	not	workable.	They	resorted	to	a	conceptual	shift	in	the	categories	and	a	perspectival	shift	from	the	ground	to	the	air	in	order	to	acquire	the	sufficiently	focused	vision	that	would	allow	them	to	make	the	conflict	legible	and	to	distinguish	civilians	from	others.		In	the	context	of	the	war	on	terror	and	particularly	of	drone	warfare,	policy	makers	and	military	leaders	in	the	US	and	the	NATO	countries	more	broadly	have	shifted	their	vocabulary	away	from	the	categories	supplied	by	the	Geneva	Conventions	(Wilke	2007).	Instead	of	“civilians”	and	“combatants,”	we	hear	about	“unlawful	combatants,”	“illegal	enemy	aliens,”	“insurgents,”	“irregular	forces,”	“militants”	or	“warlords.”	This	shift	in	categories	enables	the	modification	and	withdrawal	of	legal	protections	that	are	attached	to	the	standard	categories	of	the	laws	of	war:	for	example,	“unlawful	enemy	combatants”	who	are	not	US	citizens	were	detained	in	Guantánamo	Bay	in	contravention	of	international	legal	standards	for	the	treatment	of	prisoners	of	war.		The	persistent	references	to	persons	in	Afghanistan	as	well	as	in	Pakistan’s	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas	(FATA)	as	“militants”	and	“insurgents”	significantly	narrows	the	category	of	the	civilian	and	broadens	the	category	of	non-civilians.	Not	all	“militants”	would	be	combatants	and	thereby	legitimate	targets	of	violence	under	international	law	(Living	Under	Drones	2012,	29).	Yet	in	press	releases	and	the	news	coverage	that	relies	on	them,	the	
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use	of	the	term	“militant”	“often	implies	to	the	reader	that	the	killing	of	that	person	was	lawful”	(Living	Under	Drones	2012,	30).	This	linguistic	shift	thus	broadens	the	circle	of	persons	whose	deaths	can	seem	legal,	permissible,	or	even	required.	“Militants”	are	not	to	be	grieved	(Butler	2010);	their	inherent	hostility	and	dangerousness	justifies	their	death.	In	addition,	this	new	civilian/”militant”	binary	allows	for	new	ways	of	coding	and	categorizing	people	as	well	as	behaviors.	In	FATA	drone	strikes,	the	US	has	consistently	counted	“all	adult	males	killed	by	strikes	as	‘militants,’	absent	exonerating	evidence”	(Living	Under	Drones	2012,	x,	30).	The	civilian/non-civilian	binary	is	shifted	and	reconfigured	so	that	gender	becomes	a	proxy	for	reading	civilian	status.		The	reports	and	transcripts	about	the	Kunduz	airstrike	use	a	vocabulary	that	similarly	shifts	the	civilian/combatant	binary	to	include	more	people	as	supposedly	legitimate	targets.	While	the	civilian	status	is	gendered	in	these	documents,	in	the	Kunduz	case	there	is	no	evidence	of	a	blanket	condemnation	of	Afghan	men	as	“militants.”	Still,	the	linguistic	shifts	had	profound	effects	on	the	ways	of	seeing	and	counting	that	were	feasible:		In	NATO	communication	pertaining	to	this	air	strike,	the	operative	acronyms	(in	English	and	German)	are	“CIV”	for	“civilians”	and	“INS”	for	“insurgents,”	displacing	the	international	legal	terms	“civilian”	and	“combatant”	(ISAF	2009d).		Colonel	Klein’s	testimony	to	the	parliamentary	committee	shows	more	specific	linguistic	shifts	that	enable	him	to	categorize	persons	more	quickly.	In	response	to	the	parliamentarians’	questions,	Klein	repeatedly	confirmed	that	he	assumed	at	the	time	of	the	strike	that	all	persons	in	the	vicinity	of	the	truck	were	insurgents,	and	only	those	who	were	further	away	were	“uninvolved”––persons	“whom	others	would	call	civilians”	(Bundestag	2011,	55).	Even	with	hindsight,	he	insisted	on	not	considering	the	people	in	the	vicinity	of	the	truck	passive	or	uninvolved.	Their	involvement	was	read	through	spatial	proximity:	everyone	in	the	vicinity	of	the	truck	was	“involved”	in	something,	be	it	observing	the	unusual	nighttime	
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activities	or	the	taking	of	fuel.	The	translator	M.M.,	who	had	been	asked	by	Colonel	Klein	about	“uninvolved”	persons,	reported:	“I	was	told	[by	the	informant]	that	they	are	all	Taliban,	all	guilty	people,	all	armed”	(Bundestag	2011,	56).	Colonel	Klein’s	verbal	associations	and	qualifications	circulated	through	the	PRT’s	communications	that	night,	turning	combatants	into	insurgents	and	guilty	people;	requiring	possible	civilians	to	be	uninvolved,	not	linked	to	the	insurgency,	and	not	“guilty.”	The	handlers	of	the	informant	never	discussed	the	visual	criteria	for	distinguishing	between	civilians	and	combatants	or	between	insurgents	and	“uninvolved	persons”	(Bundestag	2011,	56).	Other	officers	insisted	that	the	informant	had	used	the	term	“civilians”	(Bundestag	2011,	56).	However,	the	words	of	the	informant	were	only	accessible	through	translation	with	its	distinct	problems	of	hierarchies,	trust,	and	translatability	(Rafael	2012).	The	term	“civilian,”	we	learn	through	the	direct	and	indirect	testimony	at	the	committee,	was	closely	associated	with	passivity,	innocence,	and	distance	from	sites	of	violence.		In	addition,	Colonel	Klein	drew	on	his	understanding	of	“normal”	local	mobility	patterns:	“since	in	this	region,	at	night	there	are	normally	only	insurgents	and	their	supporters	outdoors,	because	of	the	time	of	day,	and	because	we	were	in	the	middle	of	Ramadan,	a	time	when	people	are	not	known	to	leave	their	houses	at	night”	(Bundestag	2011,	63),	he	concluded	that	those	persons	on	the	sandbank	were	“insurgents	and	their	direct	supporters,	not	uninvolved	civilians”	(Bundestag	2011,	58).	He	was	especially	certain	that	the	Pashtun	cultural	norms	would	preclude	the	presence	of	women	at	the	scene	(Bundestag	2011,	63).	Invoking	allegedly	rigid	cultural	and	religious	norms,	Klein’s	assessments	“impose	moralized	and	disciplining	valences	on	bodies,	spaces,	and	place”	(Feldman	2005,	207).		Local	Afghan	politicians	also	invoked	moralizing	vocabularies	to	talk	about	the	airstrike	and	the	populations	they	tried	to	govern.	On	the	day	after	the	attack,	members	of	the	Provincial	Council	asserted	that	there	had	been	73	casualties,	all	of	them	insurgents	since	no	
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civilians	would	be	at	the	site	of	the	explosion	“at	this	time	of	the	day”	(Brenner	2009;	Bundestag	2011,	85).	Even	children	and	youth	among	the	injured	and	dead	were	“not	‘uninvolved’”	(Brenner	2009;	Bundestag	2011,	85).	The	category	of	civilian	as	a	person	who	shall	not	be	targeted	in	war	emerges	here	not	on	the	basis	of	international	law	but	from	political	and	moral	assessments:	civilians	are	those	who	have	not	gone	astray,	their	political	allegiances	and	moral	standing	are	in	line	with	the	expectations	of	local	authorities.	On	the	basis	of	these	assessments,	the	statements	by	the	anonymous	Afghan	informant	that	there	were	no	civilians	on	the	sandbank	appear	less	as	a	case	of	a	literal	mistranslation	than	an	instance	of	the	use	of	a	concept	that	is	open	to	a	variety	of	definitions	and	operationalizations.		While	the	term	“civilian”	is	consistently	used	in	documents	relating	to	the	Kunduz	airstrike,	it	is	juxtaposed	with	a	bewildering	range	of	terms	for	non-civilians	who	are	considered	legitimate	targets:	Taliban,	insurgents,	guilty	people,	involved	people,	and	militants.	All	of	these	terms	suggest	a	narrow	availability	of	the	civilian	status––the	claim	to	not	be	a	legitimate	target,	to	enjoy	physical	security	in	the	midst	of	conflict––to	Afghans.	These	understandings	emanate	from	a	history	in	which	the	civilian	status	and	the	relative	security	it	promises––or	at	least	outrage	if	this	expectation	is	violated––was	rarely	available	to	non-Europeans.	The	refusal	of	irregular	armed	forces	to	wear	distinct	uniforms	becomes	a	basis	for	regarding	wide	sectors	of	the	local	male	population	as	non-civilian	and	imminently	threatening,	rendering	them	vulnerable	to	a	violent	death	that	is	not	considered	a	wrong.		
5.	Gendered,	Raced,	Absent	Bodies	After	the	Kunduz	airstrike,	the	PRT	Kunduz	did	not	conduct	an	on-site	“battle	damage	assessment”	that	would	have	allowed	for	a	more	reliable	count	of	the	numbers	of	casualties	as	well	as	aid	for	injured	people	(Bundestag	2011,	71).	Instead,	the	PRT	officers	relied	on	the	estimates	of	the	F-15	pilots,	who	found	their	view	of	the	site	obstructed	by	the	fire	caused	by	
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the	explosion	(ISAF	2009b,	2009c).	When	ISAF	troops	arrived	at	the	scene	in	the	afternoon,	the	remains	of	the	dead	had	been	removed.	Thus,	the	standard	forensic	assessments	were	impossible.	How	are	the	absent	bodies	counted	and	categorized?	Colonel	Klein	construed	the	absence	of	bodies	at	the	site	as	evidence	of	the	alleged	combatant	status	of	the	victims:	“The	sandbank	looked	like	swept	clean;	the	insurgents	had	removed	all	traces	of	the	operation”	(Bundestag	2009,	71).		Does	the	absence	of	the	bodies	render	the	dead	insurgents?	An	Al	Jazeera	newscast	from	September	4,	2009	includes	footage	of	burials	of	some	of	the	dead	in	a	nearby	village.	In	the	video,	villagers	express	their	frustration	and	anger	at	the	violence	from	the	Taliban	and	NATO	forces	(Al	Jazeera	English	2009).	Ghaith	Abdul-Ahad	reported	that	the	heat	from	the	blast	was	so	intense	that	the	bodies	had	been	burnt	beyond	recognition	(2009).	Saleh	Muhamad	told	of	his	struggle	to	find	the	bodies	of	his	brother	and	his	nephew:	“I	found	one	body	and	took	it	home	and	we	buried	it.	It	was	a	full	body,	with	arms	and	legs.	We	buried	it	well.”	Jan	Mohammad	recalled,	“I	couldn't	find	my	son,	so	I	took	a	piece	of	flesh	with	me	home	and	I	called	it	my	son”	(Abdul-Ahad	2009).	Instead	of	being	able	to	identify	the	remains,	the	elders	had	to	rely	on	villagers’	accounts	of	who	was	missing	and	distributed	bodies	and	body	parts	to	those	who	were	missing	family	members.	The	bombs	had	not	just	killed	many	people;	they	also	violently	obliterated	the	possibility	of	identifying	the	human	remains	as	traces	of	specific	identifiable	persons,	deprived	the	families	of	the	possibility	of	grieving	over	and	burying	the	corpse	of	the	family	member	who	had	been	killed,	and	rendered	some	methods	of	counting	victims	and	counting	civilians	unworkable.			
6.	High-Altitude	Vision	The	shifts	in	terminology	and	the	resulting	ways	of	“coding”	the	people	on	the	ground	as	civilian	or	non-civilian	(Goodwin	1994,	606)	acquire	additional	significance	in	conjunction	
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with	the	shift	of	the	vantage	point	from	the	ground	to	the	sky.	The	“aerial	viewpoint”	(Adey	et	al.	2011)	determines	what	can	be	seen	and	how	the	visual	field	can	be	searched	for	cues	of	civilian	or	non-civilian	presences.	Yet	for	all	its	associations	with	objectivity,	measurement,	and	targeting	(Scott	1991;	Adey	at	al.	2011),	the	aerial	viewpoint	and	the	military	visual	technology	do	not	determine	how	humans	interpret	the	visual	data.			 What	did	the	view	from	the	planes	add	to	the	understanding	of	the	situation?	Throughout	the	night	of	Sept	4,	2009,	Colonel	Klein’s	only	visual	access	to	the	site	was	through	the	lenses	of	the	cameras	of	the	planes	via	the	live	video	feed.	He	was	so	dependent	on	and	invested	in	this	form	of	seeing	that	when	the	B1	bomber	had	to	return	to	the	base	to	refuel,	he	made	a	“troops	in	contact”	call	although	there	were	no	troops	on	site,	let	alone	“in	contact”	with	enemy	forces.	Two	F-15E	fighter	jets,	equipped	with	infrared	imaging	(night	vision)	cameras,	a	ROVER	connection,	and	GBU-38	bombs,	soon	reported	to	him.	The	ensuing	discussion	is	recorded,	transcribed,	and	available	online	(redacted	for	reasons	of	security,	and,	in	a	striking	number	of	cases,	the	use	of	expletives)	(ISAF	2009b).	The	pilots	controlled	the	cameras,	but	the	ROVER	technology	distributed	access	to	the	visual	images	more	widely.	As	a	consequence,	the	images	captured	by	the	“eyeballs	in	the	sky”	(Wood	2010:	32)	were	subject	to	readings	by	differently	situated	officers.	The	pilots	become	the	conduits	of	the	visual	data	rather	than	the	sole	interpreters.	Even	before	they	had	reached	the	site,	they	were	told	by	the	JTAC	(Joint	Terminal	Attack	Controller)	in	Kunduz	what	to	see	and	what	to	look	for:	“2	gas	trucks	were	stolen,	and	also	in	the	target	area	we	saw	2	pick-up	trucks	and	a	lot	of	movement	of	several	individuals	so	we	suspect	those	insurgents	…	on	a	teardrop-shape	sandbank	directly	in	the	middle	of	a	river	and	we	got	also	a	lot	of	cars	on	the	left	and	right	hand	side	of	the	river”	(ISAF	2009b,	4).	The	pilots	confirmed	their	presence	above	the	site	by	reiterating	the	description	they	were	given:	“I	see	a	lot	of	individuals	looks	like	their	[sic]	on	top	of	the	trucks	and	all	around.”	Yet	their	reading	of	the	images	was	
	 21	
different	from	the	JTAC’s	interpretation.	They	soon	established	in	inter-cockpit	communication	that	“there’s	no	like	imminent	threat	or	any	of	that	[expletive]”	(ISAF	2009b,	5).	A	few	minutes	later,	one	of	the	pilots	started	to	copy	the	language	of	“hostiles”	that	the	JTAC	was	using	throughout	the	conversation:	“also	hostile	forces	across	the	river”	(ISAF	2009b:	6).	He	immediately	retracted	this	choice	of	words,	but	only	in	an	inter-cockpit	exchange:	“err,	I	shouldn’t	have	called	those	hostile”	(ISAF	2009b:	6).	The	pilots	expressed	their	unease	with	the	situation	amongst	themselves:	“I	don’t	know	how	we’d	be	able	to	drop	anything	on	that	as	far	as	current	ROE	[rules	of	engagement]	and	stuff	like	that”	(ISAF	2009b:	4).	Yet	in	communications	with	the	JTAC,	they	were	much	more	guarded	about	their	concerns.			Instructed	by	ISAF	commander	Stanley	McChrystal	to	gauge	and	minimize	the	likelihood	of	civilian	casualties,	the	pilots	tried	to	direct	their	gaze	and	attention	of	the	ground	personnel	in	specific	directions:	they	repeatedly	asked	about	the	fate	of	the	(undisputedly	civilian)	drivers	of	the	trucks;	they	never	received	a	satisfactory	response.	The	pilots	also	persistently	offered	a	“show	of	force,”	a	low-altitude	flight	above	the	area	in	order	to	warn	and	scatter	the	people,	to	be	followed	by	dropping	bombs	on	the	trucks	(ISAF	2009b,	4,	5,	6).	This	offer	was	rejected	whenever	it	was	made.		The	pilots	doubted	the	“imminent	threat”	and	questioned	the	legality	of	an	air	strike,	but	they	allowed	their	reading	of	the	scene	to	be	trumped	by	that	of	the	ground	control	officers	with	whom	they	shared	the	images.	The	JTAC	officer	assured	them	“that’s	affirmative	we’ve	got	the	intel	information	that	everybody	down	there	is	hostile”	(ISAF	2009b,	6)	and	confirmed	that	the	people	around	the	trucks,	not	the	trucks	themselves,	were	to	be	the	target	of	the	attack	(ISAF	2009b,	7).	In	response	to	the	pilots’	repeated	request	to	confirm	that	there	was	an	imminent	threat––which	the	pilots	did	not	“see”	and	which	would	have	been	the	basis	for	Colonel	Klein’s	authority	to	order	the	strike	without	further	consultation––the	JTAC	elaborated:	“yeah	those	pax	are	an	imminent	threat,	so	those	insurgents	are	trying	to	get	all	
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the	gasoline	off	the	tanks	and	after	that	they	will	regroup	and	we’ve	got	intel	information	about	current	ops	so	probably	attacking	camp	Konduz”1	(ISAF	2009b,	10).	The	JTAC’s	reasoning	is	informed	by	the	specific	experiences	and	imaginaries	of	the	German	troops	stationed	at	PRT	Kunduz.	The	PRT’s	“creeping	belligerency”	(Spiegel	2009)	and	fear	of	the	local	population	structured	their	“field	of	visibility”	(Butler	1993,	205)	that	night.	In	a	striking	parallel	to	the	cultural	script	of	police	violence	against	Black	civilians	in	the	US	in	which	the	Black	body	becomes	“the	imminent	threat”	(Butler	1993:	208)	to	the	normatively	white	police	without	and	prior	to	any	specific	action,	the	PRT	officers	construed	a	scene	in	which	the	immobilized	vehicles	would	be	turned	into	“massive	and	deadly	bombs”	(Wood	2010,	32)	in	order	to	justify	turning	the	trucks	into	massive	and	deadly	bombs.	The	people	on	the	ground,	referred	to	as	“hostiles”	throughout	the	communication	with	the	pilots,	were	imagined	as	the	authors	and	agents	of	future	violence	that	was	so	certain	that	the	threat	was	called	“immediate.”	To	paraphrase	Butler,	the	Afghan	men	and	boys	were	bombed	in	exchange	for	violence	they	never	inflicted,	but	which	they	were	by	virtue	of	their	identities	and	demographics,	“always	about	to”	commit	(1993,	208).	Throughout	the	communication	animated	by	the	ROVER	feed,	the	ground	control	officers	insisted	on	their	specific	focus,	interpretive	frame,	and	reading	of	the	scene	as	a	site	of	an	“imminent	threat”	to	themselves.	While	this	reading	of	the	situation	speaks	to	the	German	officers’	frustration	with	the	local	Afghan	population	and	the	rise	of	the	Taliban	in	the	district,	it	was	also	strategic.	The	“imminent	threat”	and	the	“troops	in	contact”	scenario	were	enabling	fictions	that	afforded	the	PRT	commander	a	level	of	authority	he	would	not	otherwise	have	had.	The	pilots,	in	contrast,	could	not	discern	troops	in	contact	or	any	sense	of	urgency,	but	their	professional	vision,	shaped	by	the	imperative	to	exercise	caution	in	aerial	attacks,	was	overruled.		
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The	refashioned	binaries	of	“civilians”	and	“militants”	that	have	replaced	the	categories	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	categories	of	“civilian”	and	“combatant”	helped	diminish	the	“cognitive	and	perceptual	uncertainties”	inherent	in	interpreting	grainy	aerial	surveillance	footage	(see	Goodwin	1994,	609).	The	images	were	read	in	an	uneven	and	unequal	collaboration	between	the	JTAC	officers	and	the	pilots	on	the	basis	of	their	pre-existing	understandings	of	Afghan	politics,	cultures,	and	mobilities.	Their	sight	was	not	individual	but	collective	and	institutional;	it	was	contested,	“socially	situated”	and	“lodged	…	within	a	community	of	competent	practitioners”	(Goodwin	1994,	606,	626)	or	rather,	different	communities	of	practitioners	that	prioritized	different	logics:	the	protection	of	civilians	versus	the	protection	of	PRT	troops.	The	aerial	view	did	not	provide	an	impartial	“view	from	nowhere,”	but	a	vantage	point	for	conflicting	and	contested	ways	of	seeing.	The	persons	on	the	ground	had	been	established	to	be	“insurgents”	long	before	the	pilots	of	the	F-15	jets	appeared	over	the	sandbank.	The	footage	they	produced	legitimated	the	ensuing	violence,	but	it	did	not	change	the	classification	of	persons	that	the	PRT	officers	had	already	agreed	on.			
7.	Ground-level	politics	While	the	view	from	the	sky	was	open	to	multiple	interpretations,	the	view	from	the	ground	was	equally	contested.	Minutes	of	the	ISAF	investigators’	meeting	with	local	authorities	show	that	the	district	managers	of	Chahar	Darreh	and	Aliabad	thanked	the	NATO	forces	for	the	airstrike.	Omar	Khel,	district	manager	of	Chahar	Darreh,	welcomed	any	support	against	the	insurgents,	including	relatives	that	had	“strayed	from	the	right	path”	by	becoming	insurgents	(ISAF	2009d,	28).	He	surmised	that	“no	uninvolved	Afghan”	would	have	been	present	at	the	time	and	place	of	the	explosion.	About	80%	of	the	members	of	a	neighboring	tribal	group	were	allegedly	insurgents:	“there	are	Taleban	all	over	the	place,	but	many	are	from	the	Omar	Khel	tribe”	(ISAF	2009d,	35).	The	district	managers	boasted	local	knowledge,	
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but	in	the	end	the	best	evidence	of	the	victims’	insurgent	status	they	could	offer	was	that	“we	know	everyone	in	our	district”	(ISAF	2009d,	35)	and	“the	population	would	not	be	there	at	this	time”	(ISAF	2009d,	30).	These	post-strike	assessments	are	consistent	with	the	earlier	pleas	to	the	PRT	to	be	more	aggressive	in	the	fight	against	the	Taliban	(Feldenkirchen,	Gebauer	and	Koelbl	2009).		Other	residents	of	the	locality	begged	to	differ	with	the	judgment	that	good	civilians	don’t	congregate	near	fuel	trucks	at	night.	They	asked	Dr.	Habibe	Erfan	to	investigate.	With	some	help,	she	carried	out	a	thorough	investigation	of	the	numbers	of	deaths	and	the	identities	of	the	victims.	Erfan	provided	detailed	information	on	individuals	in	order	to	establish	them	as	the	kind	of	people	who	clearly	would	not	be	combatants,	and	she	also	challenged	the	“patterns	of	life”	approach	of	the	NATO	officers.	Colonel	Klein	in	particular	had	claimed	that	especially	during	Ramadan,	civilians	would	not	leave	their	houses	at	night.	In	contrast,	Erfan	suggested:	“You	know,	we	had	Ramadan,	the	month	of	fasting.	The	month	is	sacred.	But	you	have	to	wake	up	at	a	certain	time	because	you	need	to	eat	before	dawn.	Because	of	the	poverty,	when	people	heard	this	[about	the	trucks],	they	went	there	and	showed	up	at	the	scene.	…	They	went	there	for	the	fuel.	The	people	are	very	poor,	and	this	was	a	good	opportunity	to	get	some	fuel”	(Bundestag	2011,	85).	In	this	narrative,	the	“pattern	of	life”	approach	is	contextualized:	any	regular	“patterns	of	life”	had	been	strained	and	upended	by	conflict	and	poverty.	The	trucks	on	the	sandbank	along	with	the	offer	of	free	fuel	(and	a	spectacle)	disrupted	daily	Ramadan	routines.	Going	to	the	trucks	was	a	reasonable	response	to	an	unusual	event,	not	a	sign	of	being	a	non-civilian.		Furthermore,	Erfan	presented	a	different	argument	about	the	relationship	between	Taliban	and	the	local	population:	Whereas	the	local	leaders	had	warned	of	the	menace	of	the	insurgents	from	the	midst	of	the	district,	she	insisted	that	the	Taliban	had	come	from	the	outside	and	did	not	have	local	roots:	“The	Taliban	did	not	communicate	with	us,	so	that	we	
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don’t	have	casualty	numbers	from	the	Taliban,”	she	insists	(Bundestag	2011,	86).	She	could	only	establish	casualties	among	the	local	population,	which	she	took	to	be	non-Taliban.	She	consulted	school	records	to	establish	that	25	or	26	of	the	dead	were	school	children.	She	also	emphasized	that	60	to	70	victims	had	voter	ID	cards	for	the	2009	election	(Bundestag	2011,	86).	Since	the	Taliban	boycotted	the	elections	and	had	threatened	to	“cut	off	all	fingers	stained	with	the	indelible	ink	used	to	prevent	multiple	voting”	(Feldenkirchen,	Gebauer,	and	Koelbl	2009),	their	supporters	would	not	be	expected	to	register	to	vote.		In	response	to	the	statistical,	moralizing,	or	simply	guessed	numbers	of	civilian	casualties,	Erfan	pieced	together	a	report	that	is	rich	in	local	knowledges	and	treated	specific	markers––voter	IDs,	age,	school	records––as	indications	of	civilian	status.	Her	approach	and	the	resulting	report	indicated	substantial	disagreement	among	members	of	local	political	elites	about	how	to	define	and	identify	civilians	and	insurgents.	Thus,	there	were	different	local	knowledges	that	ISAF	investigators	and	the	German	parliamentary	committee	could	draw	on.	They	opted	for	the	“violent	epistemologies”	(Adey	et	al.	2011:	177)	of	the	JTAC	officers	and	the	local	political	elites	that	read	group	membership	of	those	who	were	killed	off	from	their	location	at	the	time	of	their	violent	deaths.	Consistent	with	the	“racist”	(and	colonial)	“episteme”	(Butler	1993:	206)	according	to	which	Afghans	were	potential	threats	to	ISAF	troops	and	the	focus	of	“new	surveillance”	on	patterns	of	movement	rather	than	the	tracking	of	individual	persons	(Marx	2002;	Haggerty	&	Ericson	2000),	this	approach	established	the	boys	and	men	around	the	trucks	as	legitimate	targets	without	knowing	who	they	are––	or	were––individually.			
7.	Knowing	Violence	How	are	these	different	ways	of	seeing	and	counting	civilians	evaluated,	reconciled,	and	taken	up	in	the	reports	and	consequent	actions	of	those	who	exercise	political	and	legal	
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authority?	The	report	affords	the	aerial	viewpoint,	the	perspective	of	control,	tracking,	and	targeting	at	a	distance	(see	Adey	at	al.	2011:	176),	a	privileged	position	in	the	“hierarchy	of	the	credibilities”	(Stoler	2009).	It	does	not	problematize	the	disagreements	between	the	pilots	and	the	officers	on	the	ground.	The	view	from	above	becomes	objective	and	authoritative	(Scott	1991);	the	labor	that	goes	into	coding,	highlighting	and	reading	the	footage	(Vertesi	2014;	Goodwin	1994)	remains	unnoticed.	The	parliamentary	committee’s	report	states	that	the	video	footages	shows	about	50	persons	“clearly”	and	that	the	various	lists	of	victims	contain	about	50	names	that	are	on	all	lists.	As	a	result,	“one	can	assume	that	there	were	about	50	victims	(dead	or	injured)”	(Bundestag	2011,	207).	This	count	of	overall	casualties	is	much	lower	than	that	of	any	other	inquiry	after	the	night	of	the	bombing.	It	is	also	remarkable,	since	Amnesty	International,	the	UN	Mission,	the	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	and	Habibe	Erfan	had	each	published	lists	with	confirmed	victims	that	contained,	respectively,	83,	74,	102,	and	113	names.	Thus,	the	majority	of	the	German	parliamentary	committee	was	not	only	unwilling	to	see	dead	civilians;	it	was	also	very	skeptical	about	any	claims	of	violent	death.	The	dissenting	minority	report	did	not	settle	on	any	specific	number	but	pointed	out	that	it	is	beyond	doubt	that	civilians,	including	at	least	25	children	under	15	years	of	age,	had	been	killed	(Bundestag	2011,	223).	In	the	absence	of	women	among	the	dead,	childhood	becomes	the	only	credible	proxy	and	marker	of	likely	civilian	status.		The	committee’s	majority	was	very	critical	of	reports	based	on	evidence	from	the	surrounding	villages:	“all	these	reports	are	based	on	interviews	with	nearby	villagers.	There	are	no	objective	criteria”	for	assessing	the	victims’	civilian	or	combatant	status	(Bundestag	2011,	206).	Erfan’s	detailed	investigations,	for	example,	were	not	“scientific”	enough:	“those	were	not	investigations	in	the	true	sense	of	the	word,	instead	she	uncritically	adopted	the	claims	of	the	interviewees”	(Bundestag	2011,	206).	The	Parliamentary	committee’s	majority	
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distrusted	the	reports	that	are	based	on	interviews	and	local	knowledges	because	relatives	of	those	who	were	killed	will	not	admit	that	their	family	members	were	in	fact	Taliban	(Bundestag	2011,	206).	Human	sources	of	information	were	deemed	suspicious	because	of	their	proximity	and	relationship	to	the	victims	or	to	opposing	parties	to	the	conflict.	The	“everyday	experience”	(Feldman	2005,	206)	of	the	local	population	gets	vacated	and	displaced	with	a	combination	of	reliance	on	surveillance	technology	and	stereotypical	moralizing	assessments	about	religious	duties	and	people	out	of	place.	The	technologically	mediated	images	were	presented	as	if	they	could	speak	for	themselves	and	did	not	need	interpretation––eliding	the	debate	about	who	and	what	was	visible	to	the	officers	in	the	night	of	the	bombing.	While	the	German	parliamentary	committee	relied	on	a	particular	reading	of	images	produced	with	advanced	technology	while	disavowing	the	fact	of	interpretation,	the	ISAF	command	acted	on	its	own	reports	that	suggested	high	numbers	of	civilian	casualties	and	significant	deviations	from	the	rules	of	engagement.	On	the	day	following	the	air	strike,	the	German	JTAC	commander	Wilhelm	was	suspended	from	his	duties	(Brenner	2009;	Frankfurter	Rundschau	2009).	A	few	days	after	the	strike,	the	two	US	pilots	who	had	released	the	bombs	despite	their	qualms	about	the	legality	and	appropriateness	of	this	course	of	action	were	demoted	(Kornelius	2010).	Colonel	Klein,	who	is	subject	to	ISAF	authority,	but	also	enjoys	the	protection	of	the	German	state,	especially	the	Ministry	of	Defense,	has	not	faced	any	professional	or	legal	consequences:	the	German	Ministry	of	Defense	prevented	ISAF	from	demoting	or	suspending	him,	the	Attorney	General	refused	to	proceed	with	a	criminal	investigation	in	this	matter,	and	in	October	2016	the	Federal	High	Court	rejected	an	appeal	of	victims	who	sued	the	German	state	for	damages	(Spiegel	2016).				
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8.	Conclusion:	Counting,	Seeing,	and	the	Production	of	Certainty	After	numerous	investigations,	the	September	2009	Kunduz	air	strike	remains	contested:	there	is	disagreement	about	whether	it	was	legally	or	ethically	defensible,	and	reports	disagree	about	how	many	people	were	killed,	and	how	many	of	these	people	were	civilians.	As	Merry	and	Coutin	remind	us,	understanding	conflict	requires	“attending	to	the	features	of	the	[]	knowledge	systems”	by	which	truth	about	conflicts	are	produced	(2014,	2).	In	probing	the	interaction	between	military	visual	technologies	and	human	agency,	this	article	has	shown	that	the	addition	of	sensory	prostheses	in	the	form	of	“eyeballs	in	the	sky”	(Wood	2010:	32)	does	not	have	a	uniform	and	predictable	set	of	effects.	These	technologies	help	to	make	sites	visible	that	would	otherwise	be	visually	inaccessible.	They	also	enable	violence	against	specific	targets	that	would	otherwise	not	be	chosen	for	lack	of	accessibility.	Yet	the	interpretations	of	the	visual	images	and	the	decisions	on	targeting	are	shaped	by	background	assumptions	and	situated	knowledges,	including	fantasies	of	race,	risk,	and	violence.	The	divergences	between	the	pilots’	and	the	PRT	officers’	ways	of	seeing	highlight	that	seeing	is	not	simply	a	biological	process,	but	a	social	and	situated	activity.	The	literature	on	professional	vision	highlights	that	specific	ways	of	seeing	are	taught	and	trained.	A	shared	professional	vision	is	not	a	given,	but	rather	the	result	of	ongoing	collaboration,	socialization,	and	the	pressure	to	conform.	The	conversations	leading	up	to	the	air	strike	and	the	investigations	of	the	casualties	show	that	professional	communities	do	not	always	share	one	way	of	looking	at	images.	The	NATO	community	was	internally	divided	about	their	understanding	of	the	conflict	and	political	priorities.	These	divergent	background	assumptions	influenced	the	interpretation	of	the	technologically	mediated	images.	Interpretations	of	technologically	mediated	visual	evidence	is	crucial	for	confronting	state	violence	committed	by	military	and	police	officers	that	will	show	clear	patterns	of	racial,	gender,	and	class	disparity.	As	a	consequence,	a	better	understanding	of	how	professionals	of	
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violence	come	to	see,	anticipate,	and	respond	to	differently	racialized	and	gendered	bodies	is	imperative.	If	professional	vision	is	never	undisputed,	always	a	work	in	progress,	and	socially	situated,	it	can	be	changed.	It	is	possible	to	imagine	otherwise	and	to	see	otherwise.	The	proliferation	of	images	of	military	and	police	violence––whether	drone	strikes	or	traffic	stops	ending	with	a	beating	or	even	death––cannot	reduce	or	address	this	violence	by	itself.	To	the	eye	that	has	been	trained	to	see	Black	or	Afghan	bodies	as	sources	of	danger,	the	availability	of	visual	images	will	not	make	a	difference.	Yet	the	public	availability	of	the	images	can	highlight	divergences	in	interpretations	and	allows	for	counter-readings,	not	only	of	the	sequences	of	violence,	but	also	of	“the	racist	schema	that	orchestrates	and	interprets	the	event,	which	splits	the	violent	intention	off	from	the	body	who	wields	it	and	attributes	it	to	the	body	who	receives	it”	(Butler	1993,	210).	In	Afghanistan	and	in	situations	of	armed	conflict	more	generally,	the	distinction	between	civilians	and	non-civilians	is	a	crucial	dimension	of	seeing,	intervening	in,	and	responding	to	violence.	The	protection	of	civilians	is	an	almost	universally	proclaimed	goal;	it	is	the	centerpiece	of	the	ISAF	2009	Tactical	Directive.	Yet	without	a	reliable	understanding	of	who	counts	as	a	civilian	and	how	they	can	be	recognized,	the	promise	of	civilian	protection	rings	hollow.	The	category	of	the	civilian,	derived	from	specific	Eurocentric	understandings	of	armed	conflict,	had	been	grafted	onto	Afghanistan	and	Afghans	who	had	to	negotiate	their	security	amidst	conflict.	Yet	it	is	not	clear	what	Afghans	should	do	or	avoid	in	order	to	be	recognized	as	civilians.	Those	who	shared	the	aerial	viewpoint	could	not	agree	on	the	civilian	status	of	the	people	near	the	trucks,	and	neither	could	those	who	had	extensive	personal	knowledge	of	the	local	social	structures.	Thus	a	shift	in	perspective	did	not	solve	the	problem	that	civilians	are	not	clearly	recognizable	to	those	who	have	a	mission	to	spare	and	protect	them.	At	a	deeper	level,	the	lack	of	consensus	about	visually	identifying	civilians	indicates	a	lack	of	agreement	about	who	counts	as	a	civilian.	NATO	officers	consistently	try	to	stabilize	
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and	shrink	the	category	of	civilian	by	juxtaposing	it	with	a	wide	category	of	non-civilians:	insurgents,	militants,	supporters,	and	Taliban.		The	rush	to	counting	civilian	casualties	and	disputing	conflicting	casualty	counts	also	partakes	in	the	production	and	stabilization	of	the	category	of	the	civilian	as	knowable.	After	all,	the	practice	of	counting	civilian	casualties,	whether	done	by	NGOS,	NATO,	or	a	national	government,	suggests	that	civilians	are	a	distinct	category	and	can	be	recognized	by	those	properly	trained	to	do	so.	The	debates	about	the	precise	numbers	of	civilian	casualties	“construct…	a	façade	of	certainty	over	blurred	social	boundaries”	(Merry	and	Coutin	2014,	2)	and	produce	the	category	of	the	civilian	as	unambiguous	and	stable.	Yet	civilians	don’t	simply	exist.	They	are	enacted	and	produced	by,	among	other	sites,	socially	situated	interpretation	of	images	produced	with	the	aid	of	visual	technologies.	Socio-cultural	prisms	of	visibility	not	only	produce	counts	of	legitimate	civilians,	but	also	legitimize	the	category	of	civilian	as	a	workable	and	meaningful	foundation	of	international	law.	The	people	who	would	like	to	be	regarded	as	civilians	bear	the	burden	of	distinguishing	themselves	from	putative	non-civilians	according	to	criteria	that	they	can	never	fully	grasp	because	they	don’t	know	which	background	knowledges	and	epistemes	will	be	mobilized	by	those	in	charge	of	distinguishing	civilians	from	combatants.			
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Images				
		Fig.	1		The	people	and	the	trucks	on	the	sandbank,	seen	through	the	F-15E	infrared	camera.	(Screenshot	from	ISAF	2009c).		
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Fig.	2	The	Explosion.	(Screenshot	from	ISAF	2009c.)					
	Fig.	3	The	Explosion.	(Screenshot	from	ISAF	2009c.)			
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Fig	4.	The	impact	(Screenshot	from	ISAF	2009c)																																																														1	The	documents	use	a	variety	of	spellings	of	Afghan	place	names	such	as	Kunduz/Konduz/Kundus.	There	are	also	different	spellings	of	“Taliban,”	notably	“Taleban.”	These	spellings	are	treated	as	variations	in	transliterations	into	different	languages	that	do	not	share	rules	about	pronouncing	vowels	(for	example	English	and	German)	rather	than	as	typographical	errors.	
